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After nearly three decades of searching for general
theories of political development, most western and
western-influenced scholars still have not abandoned
their preoccupation with studying the casual relation-
ships between democracy and socioeconomic
development, thus maintaining the fundamental
assumption that political development essentially is a
two-dimensional phenomenon. This is evident, for
example, in a recent major work on democracy in
developing countries, where one of the editors, a
prominent political scientist, wrote in his introduction
to the volume:
Generations of theory have grappled with the
relationships between democracy and both the
level and the process of socioeconomic develop-
ment. The evidence from our ten cases cannot settle
the spirited theoretical controversies that remain
with us. Nevertheless, some important insights do
emerge. The most obvious of these is the simple
static observation that democracy is not incom-
patible with a low level of development.1
This preoccupation reflects certain poverty of ideas in
western political science. This in turn is rooted in its
epistemology, which is essentially based on the
Aristotelian concept of politics, and rendered more
permanent by the influence of the positivist
behavioural scientists of the l960s, who incorporated
structural-functionalism into the study of comparative
politics.
'The polis is by physis', wrote Aristotle in his Politics.
The concept of physis implies the whole process of
growth and the concept of being 'grown' as well as the
beginning of growing. The whole organised political
community (both the centre and periphery) is capable
of growing, and can also be decaying, declining,
degenerating.
The Aristotelian concept of 'Dynamic Nature' leads to
the attempt to classify and typologise societies and
political systems. Hence political development and
modernisation theories, as Lucian Pye correctly
observes, have generally been heuristic theories and
the focus has been to spell out concepts and identify
factors and processes so as better to guide empirical
work. By providing preliminary bases for classification
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and typology-building, the theories set the stage for
case-studies with comparative dimensions.2
This in turn has three major consequences. One is the
tendency to conceive political development in terms of
two general dichotomies, that is 'modern' versus
'traditional' societies, and 'democratic' versus 'non-
democratic' political systems. The second is the
predisposition to analyse political development in
terms of qualitative changes in values, structures and
functions of given political systems, where new values,
structures and functions are seen to replace existing
ones. The third is the notion that the process of
qualitative change is characterised by conflict,
whereby opposing forces, for example tradition and
modernity, interact in a dialectical mode of thesis,
anti-thesis and synthesis.
The modernisationist theories, both the structural-
functional and political cultural schools, have been
similarly caught up in this 'Aristotelian trap'. Political
culture theories have been criticised as being culturally
deterministic as well as psychologically reductionist. It
has also been pointed out that their theory suffers
from a lack of dynamism since studies of political
culture have failed to deal with the dialectical forces of
change. More importantly, their concept of change is
inextricably linked with incrementalism and
gradualism which carries the political system to its
natural end, to the ideal civic culture.3
Studies of political culture in the past three decades
have relied heavily on analyses of the political
socialisation process. The problem is that the
mainstream of research focuses almost exclusively on
the development of children's political attitudes in
stable democratic societies while adult experiences are
treated as only marginally significant.
In his recent paper Gabriel Almond argued that the
cultural determinism approach is a distortion of his
and other theories of political culture and democracy.
Political culture has never been viewed by this school
as a uniform, monolithic, and unchanging
phenomenon that is open to evolution and change
over time. 'Political culture affects political and
government structure and performance - constrains
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it, but surely does not determine it'.4 This observation
is confirmed by the empirical evidence from a recent
comparative study of democracy in 26 developing
countries. This study demonstrates that the political
culture of a country, while it may affect the character
and viability of democracy, is itself shaped by the
contemporary political, economic and social structures,
as well as by the historical and cultural inheritance of
the past. In other words, the political culture may be as
much a consequence of the political system as a cause
of it.5
Perhaps the criticism of cultural determinism
stemmed not from the charge that the political culture
theory lacks dynamism but rather from its pre-
occupation with only one direction of change, that is,
along more democratic lines. While it is widely
accepted that democracy is the least evil form of
government, and democratic institutions are better
than others that might be established, one may fail to
understand the nature and dynamics of change in
developing nations if the 'core component' of
democratic culture is rigidly used as a single frame of
reference.
The main problem of political development theories is
the tendency to conceive political development in
terms of two general dichotomies; 'modern' versus
'traditional' societies, and 'democratic' versus 'non-
democratic' political systems. There is also the
predisposition to analyse political development in
terms of qualitative change in values, structures, and
functions of given political systems, where new values,
structures and functions are seen to replace existing
ones. Any study of state elites and mass political
culture in non-developing nations must first confront
this epistemological issue.
In a recent study of the experience of nine states in
Asia and the Pacific (China, Indonesia, Japan,
Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea,
Taiwan and Thailand), it was recognised that neither
the classical Marxist approach nor the liberal
structural-functional theory which lay behind much of
the modernisationist approach was adequate in
understanding the dynamism of changes in that
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region. The study views the state as relatively
autonomous, and focuses its attention on the
relationships between the state and society in the
allocation and exercise of power. Although this study
veered away from conventional approaches, it still
suffers from the traditional tendency to make a
typology of regimes based on the Aristotelian concept
modified by DahI. Hence the nine states in Asia and
the Pacific are categoried into:
Leninist states essentially representing a monopoly
of power by the state or party as master of the state;
democratic states representing a regime in which
the officers of the state are selected by society by
contestation in a free environment;
the authoritarian, semi-authoritarian, and semi-
democratic states representing varying degrees in
between of the state's influence over society or
society's influence over the state.6
This study has also tried to establish a paradigm of
political trends based on the above-mentioned model.7
See Figure 1.
Although this typology has incorporated a paradigm
of political trends to reduce the mechanical nature of
the model, it nevertheless neglects the arena or policy
areas in which the state and society interact. The
extent to which each regime performs its tasks may be
a combination of both reformist and transformationist
means, and it is debatable whether a liberalising
direction is pursued in all policy areas. In other words,
while China, the Soviet Union, Vietnam, Cambodia,
and Laos have shown some liberalising trends in
economic activities (the development dimension),
party leaders in these countries are less keen to pursue
the same approach in other policy areas (security and
political participation).
The paradigm rooted in Aristotelian epistemology is
inappropriate for studying Asian political systems.
For in these systems the relationship between state and
society is more complex and multidimensional than in
western ones. And liberal democratic values,
structures and functions - if they exist at all -
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constitute only one dimension of state-society relations.
Furthermore, in Asian societies, change largely
involves adjustment and coexistence between opposing
forces, rather than conflict playing itself out through
an objective dialectical process. Or to put it another
way, in Asian societies, political cultures, structures,
functions and processes are mixed.
The relationship between state and society in
developing nations is a three-dimensional one, namely
security (S), development (D), and participation (P),
and the resultant political processes involve inter-
actions among these three dimensions. Here
'democracy' is not a form of political system or a type
of regime à la Aristotle, but a dimension of state-
society relations which are in flux, adjusting to or
coexisting and interacting with other dimensions of
the state-society relationship.
The dominance of one dimension over the others is
due to four major variables related to the state:
ideological domination, institutionalisation of struc-
ture, the capacity to control and utilise resources, and
the adaptive capacity (or the capacity to escape the
surrounding societa' forces).
Hence, instead of using the Aristotelian concept of
political change and development which views
changes in terms of societal forces opposing and
replacing one another in a progressive unilinear
direction, the three-dimensional state model argues
that Third World states encompass within themselves
many apparently contradictory characteristics and
structures, for example, those of development and
underdevelopment, democracy and authoritarianism
civilian and military rule, at the same time. These
contradictory characteristics of Third World political
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systems are a reflection of their economic and social
structures and the different modes of production -
feudal capitalist and even socialist - that coexist
within Third World societies. At the political level
such structures and characteristics struggle against
each other, but most of the time, they also come to
terms with each other and continue to coexist in
uneasy harmony.
Figure 2 shows major characteristics of the Three
Dimensional State coexisting, interacting without any
single dimension or mode being capable of completely
replacing the other. The result is not a synthesis which
exists in one form (democracy, authoritarianism), but
an evolving admixture with three dimensions
coexisting.
Because there is no single enduring synthesis, it is
impossible to speak of a political system and politics as
an authoritative allocation of values in society. It is
also difficult to apply concepts of legitimacy and
consensus in such a complex situation, as in the cases
of Burma and Cambodia, since there are not only
competing 'primordial' loyalties (ethnic, cultural) but
also highly complicated ideological values, operating
structures, modes of operations and relationships
which each group has with the public. The unsettled
conflict in Cambodia is a classic example of a situation
in which the Eastonian concept of politics became
analytically 'dysfunctional'.
The Three-Dimensional State model recognises a
longstanding fact: that a regime, no matter what type
of power distribution it has, must pursue at least three
goals in order to maintain its power.
It is this relatively all-encompassing legitimacy
formula that forces rulers of Third World states to
The Three-Dimensional State: Major Characteristics
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express concern for two other dimensions of the
political system - development and participation -
that have gained increasing importance during this
century in the world at large, and in the last four
decades in the decolonised parts of the globe in
particular. The rulers' interest in these two dimensions
of the political system is principally based on their
recognition that they cannot achieve a degree of
legitimacy in the eyes of their subjects (which would
allow them to sustain themselves in power without
excessive use of force) unless their preoccupation with
security is tempered by their concern for the economic
development of the people over whom they rule or
alternatively, their commitment to enlarge their
popular base of support by providing increasing
avenues for the participation of citizens in the political
life of the country and in the choice of its rulers. Better
still, if they are able simultaneously to appear
committed to both developmental and participatory
values, in addition to their commitment to the security
of the state, their legitimacy among their countries'
populations is usually greatly enhanced.
This emphasis on development and participation in
addition to security and state-building immensely
complicates the task of Third World leaders for, as a
result, the demands upon them have increased three-
fold as compared to the demands on the rulers of the
early period of the absolutist state in Europe (for that
is the comparable stage of development in terms of
state-building that most Third World states are at
today). Those European rulers could single-mindedly
pursue their goal of state-building without being
bothered about escalating demands for political
participation and economic redistribution. While the
generation of national wealth was one of their major
goals as well, this was pursued for the sake of
augmenting the power of the absolutist state and,
therefore, was an instrument of state-building and was
accompanied by a strategy for the centralisation of
control over economic resources. It was not perceived
by the rulers of the absolutist state as a part of a
welfare ideology that was essential to their legitimacy
formula.
Today the demonstration effect produced by the
existence of the representative and welfare state in
most parts of the industrialised world on the
populations of the Third World states makes it
imperative that Third World leaders swear by the
values of development and participation if they are to
achieve the minimum legitimacy necessary for them to
carry out the work of governing their societies without
the use of excessive and brutal force. The different
ways in which they do this provide the variations on
what can be called the SDP state, where S stands for
security, D for development and P for participation.
Theoretically, these variations can range from SDP,
where security is the paramount value, followed by
development and participation in that order, to PDS
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where participation is the paramount value, followed
by development and security in that order. The
possible variations lying in between are, once again
theoretically, SPD, DSP, DPS and PSD.
However, most post-colonial and most Southeast
Asian regimes are likely to assign the highest value to
security among the three objectives mentioned above.
But in some cases and for limited periods -
participation in the case of the Philippines just after
the overthrow of Marcos - can temporarily reach the
top of a particular government's political agenda.
Such an ordering of priorities usually does not last
very long and the insecurities of post-colonial state
structures as well as of their regimes soon reassert
themselves to make security the prime consideration
once again. This happened in the Philippines once the
euphoria generated by the Teople Power' revolution
had declined. This means that for all practical
purposes, there are only two types of states and
regimes that we need to be concerned with in our
analysis: the SDP state, where development takes
precedence over participation, and the SDP state,
where participation takes precedence over develop-
ment. In both cases security remains the foremost
objective of the governments concerned.
Nevertheless, even when in normal times security is
accorded pride of place in governmental agendas
around the Third World, including in Southeast Asia,
there are two characteristics that distinguish one
policy from another and one regime from the next.
The first of these is the ordering of the development
and participation priorities. In most Third World
countries development (at least as measured by GNP)
takes precedence over participation. But there are
enough Third World polities - like India and,
currently, the Philippines and Argentina - where this
equation between development and participation is
reversed and maintained for a long enough period for
the analyst to conclude that they form a sub-category
of Third World polities in their own right.
The second distinguished characteristic is the
difference in the weightage accorded to security in
relation to the other two objectives. Crudely put, this
difference could vary from the order of 10 to 1 (or
more) to 2 to 1 (or less) between security and the next
most important objective on the regime's agenda. This
difference in the relative weightage of objectives is, in
fact, of greater importance in determining the
character of a state and of its leadership than the
ordering of developmental and participatory priorities
vis-à-vis each other. This conclusion emerges from the
simple consideration that the development-partici-
pation relationship, however important in its own
right as an analytical problem, is in the case of the
overwhelming number of Third World states basically
a relationship between two secondary objectives.
However, the relative importance of security on the
one hand, and development and participation on the
other involves the relationship between a regime's
primary and secondary objectives.8
For further details on this three-dimensional model, see M. Ayoob
and Chai-Anan Samudavanija (eds.), Leadership Perceptions and
National Security: The Southeast Asian Experience, (Singapore,
1988).
Each of these three objectives always influences the
character and direction of the other two. It is,
therefore, important to keep in mind the nature of
contradictions in Third World polities and societies
which are always in disequilibrium. Events tend to
proceed not in a unilinear direction, but in a gyric
manner. The principal object of polities, I believe, is a
ceaseless effort to create an equilibrium which is at
best conditional and short-term in nature.
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